Watch Where You Walk – Every Time

Georgia Supreme Court Vacates Court of Appeals in SMG Construction Services, LLC v. Cook

Date: October 15, 2025 Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Case: SMG Construction Services, LLC v. Cook, S25G0389

Facts (Plain English)

Daniel Cook was working as an independent contractor installing cabinets on the second floor of an active construction site. Just steps away from his work area was an unguarded, open ledge. Cook had seen this ledge earlier that day while moving around the site.

While straightening an air hose, Cook shuffled backwards toward the ledge and fell off, suffering significant injuries.

Cook sued SMG Construction, the property owner, for failing to keep the premises safe—specifically for leaving the ledge unguarded.

SMG moved for summary judgment, arguing:

• Cook knew about the open ledge,
• He voluntarily approached it,
• He failed to exercise ordinary care by walking backwards toward it, and
• As an independent contractor, he assumed the risks inherent in the site.

The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for SMG.

The Court of Appeals reversed, saying there were jury issues about whether conditions (dust, lighting, "camouflage") affected Cook's ability to perceive the exact location of the ledge.

The Georgia Supreme Court has now vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and sent the case back.

Holding

The Supreme Court held:

1. Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard.

Cook admitted:

• He saw the ledge earlier,
• He knew it had no guardrail,
• He knew it dropped off.

The Court of Appeals confused "actual knowledge" with "constructive knowledge." The Supreme Court said: you don't get to avoid summary judgment by claiming you misjudged the exact edge of a hazard you already knew existed.

2. Because Cook had actual knowledge, the Court of Appeals should have analyzed SMG's affirmative defenses.

Those defenses include:

• Assumption of the risk (common for independent contractors),
• Voluntary negligence/contributory negligence (walking backwards toward an open drop).

The Supreme Court did not decide whether SMG wins—only that the Court of Appeals must now analyze the remaining elements.

Result: Decision vacated → case remanded.

Questions & Comments

1. Why is Cook's knowledge so important? In Georgia premises liability, the core question is always: Who knew more about the hazard—the landowner or the plaintiff?

2. Does it matter that Cook thought the edge was further away? The Court says no. Actual knowledge means knowing about the hazard—not perfect awareness of its exact boundaries.

3. Why does independent contractor status matter? Contractors often assume the risks inherent in construction sites, which can bar recovery.

4. Is the case over? Not yet. The Court of Appeals must now decide whether SMG has proven the rest of its defenses as a matter of law.

Full Text of the Opinion

Bethel, Justice.

While working as an independent contractor installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom of an active residential construction project, Daniel Cook fell from an exposed ledge resulting in serious injuries. At the time of his fall, Cook was attempting to straighten an air hose while moving backward toward the exposed ledge he had previously observed outside the bathroom. Cook filed suit against SMG Construction Services, the owner of the property, alleging, among other things, that SMG's failure to maintain a safe premises caused his injuries. SMG moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined that, because Cook had actual knowledge of the exposed ledge from which he fell after voluntarily approaching, he was barred from recovery. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, although Cook knew of the exposed ledge, evidence that "existing conditions affected his ability to perceive [the unsecured ledge's] exact location and appreciate the specific risk it posed to him" created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook's knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG's. Cook v. SMG Constr. Servs., LLC, 373 Ga. App. 354, 358 (2024). For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the decision of the Court of Appeals conflated the concepts of actual knowledge and constructive knowledge and erroneously relied on principles applicable to constructive knowledge to erroneously conclude that a question of material fact exists with respect to whether Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard in this case. And because the Court of Appeals stopped its analysis at that erroneous conclusion, it did not consider all the elements of SMG's affirmative defenses. So we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The legal standard applicable to motions for summary judgment is well settled. On appeal from a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review, "view[ing] the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Johnson St. Props., LLC v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 52 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). Under OCGA § 9-11-56, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A defendant may prevail on a motion for summary judgment by "presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff's claims" or by "point[ing] out by reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support any essential element of the [plaintiff's] case." Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted). A defendant also may prevail on summary judgment by presenting undisputed evidence that establishes an affirmative defense. See Miller v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 339 Ga. App. 638, 643 (2016).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, SMG highlighted evidence concerning Cook's knowledge of the absence of a guardrail. Specifically, SMG pointed to Cook's deposition testimony showing that Cook was installing cabinets in a second-floor bathroom of the construction site; that the bathroom was located off an "open foyer" area within one to two steps of the exposed ledge; that Cook, from his own observations, "knew [the ledge] was open" and did not have a guardrail; and that Cook "could see where [the ledge] dropped off." This evidence, SMG argued, supported the grant of summary judgment for several reasons. First, SMG asserted that, because Cook was an independent contractor, he was responsible for determining for himself the safety (or lack thereof) in his workspace. Second, SMG argued that Cook's testimony showed he had actual knowledge of the open and obvious unguarded ledge and that testimony, coupled with his admission that he fell off the ledge while shuffling backwards in the ledge's direction, established that Cook failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. And third, SMG contended that Cook's knowledge of the hazard was at least equal to its own such that SMG owed Cook no duty to warn or otherwise protect him against the risk posed by the exposed ledge.

The trial court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding both that Cook "had equal knowledge to [SMG] of the hazard" and that Cook failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. And pointing to Cook's deposition testimony that he "was actually aware of the lack of railing on the ledge he fell from but did not give it a second thought as it was not in his direct workspace," the trial court found that Cook had "actual knowledge of the hazard" and that "no further inquiry into [SMG's] liability [was] required."

Cook appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. See Cook, 373 Ga. App. at 361. In doing so, the court organized its analysis around the question of whether Cook "'lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of" SMG. Id. at 356 (quoting Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748-49 (1997)). After acknowledging Cook's admitted and likewise undisputed knowledge of the exposed ledge, the court reasoned that the ledge was a mere "generally prevailing hazard" and that SMG was required to show Cook's actual knowledge of "the proximity of the balcony's edge to the area on the second floor where he was working." Cook, 373 Ga. App. at 357-59. And pointing to other testimony from Cook that certain conditions affected his ability to perceive the exact point at which the ledge ended, the court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed "as to whether Cook's knowledge of the specific hazard ... was equal to or greater than SMG's, and whether he exercised ordinary care for his own safety under the circumstances." Id. at 358-59. We granted certiorari to address that holding.

We begin our analysis with the principles of premises liability law applicable to this case. As with other varieties of negligence claims, plaintiffs seeking to hold landowners liable for damages on a premises-liability theory must show four elements: duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages. See Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480, 484 (2019). Under OCGA § 51-3-1, a landowner owes to an invitee a duty of ordinary care "in keeping the premises and approaches safe," and a landowner may be liable for damages suffered by an invitee whose injuries "were caused by [the landowner's] failure to exercise ordinary care" in doing so. Johnson St. Props., LLC, 302 Ga. at 53 (quotation marks omitted). In this context, we have explained that the true ground of liability is the [landowner's] superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. Landings Assn. v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 399 (2012) (alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). See also Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 (1991). Thus, premises-liability litigation often turns on issues related to the knowledge of the hazard possessed by the defendant, the plaintiff, or both.

The knowledge possessed by the plaintiff likewise "is relevant to the ultimate question of liability," Ga. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 727 n.7 (2023), and is essential to the frequently raised affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. See Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-08 (1999); Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735, 748-49. Whether a landowner argues that a plaintiff had actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the hazard, our case law requires evidence establishing the plaintiff's knowledge of "the specific hazard which precipitate[d] the injury" and "not merely [his] knowledge of the generally prevailing hazardous conditions or of the hazardous conditions which [he] observes and avoids." Clure, 302 Ga. at 56 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Turning to the case at hand, SMG relied on evidence purporting to show Cook's knowledge of the exposed ledge in an effort to demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment on an affirmative defense. SMG's first argument implicates the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. And its second argument implicates the affirmative defense of voluntary negligence, a type of contributory negligence. To prevail on either defense, SMG must first establish that Cook had knowledge of the hazard at issue.

We agree with the trial court that Cook's testimony about his own personal observations of the unguarded ledge establishes that he had actual knowledge of the unguarded ledge. This evidence also shows that Cook had actual knowledge of the specific hazard that was the proximate cause of his injuries. A plaintiff's misapprehension of the precise details of a known hazard does not negate his actual knowledge of that hazard.

Cook argues that conditions within the premises "created an optical illusion that camouflaged the closeness of the balcony edge to [Cook's] work area." But this line of reasoning relies on inapposite case law concerning constructive knowledge, not actual knowledge. Evidence that certain conditions obscured the plaintiff's view may create a fact issue as to constructive knowledge but is insufficient to create a question of material fact as to actual knowledge.

Our conclusion that no issue of material fact exists with respect to Cook's actual knowledge is not the end of the inquiry because knowledge is only one element of the affirmative defenses raised. We leave it to the Court of Appeals to determine on remand whether SMG has also shown the absence of any question of material fact concerning the other elements of its affirmative defenses.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur, except Peterson, C.J., and Ellington and McMillian, JJ., who dissent.

Dissenting Opinion

McMillian, Justice, dissenting.

Because I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that there are genuine issues of material fact, the judgment should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.

The majority reframes the "actual knowledge" standard to mean knowledge of the general hazard versus knowledge of the specific hazard. In Clure, we made it clear that knowledge of the general hazard was not sufficient to require summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact existed as to the plaintiff's knowledge of the specific hazard.

Cook testified that conditions obscured his perception of the edge. Viewed in the light most favorable to him, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that his knowledge of the specific hazard was equal to or greater than SMG's.

For this reason, I would affirm the Court of Appeals's decision and respectfully dissent.

I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Peterson and Justice Ellington join in this dissent.